Security: Unsandboxed JSR223 Script Execution Enables Arbitrary Code Execution#858
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JSR223ScriptExecutor.load() compiles arbitrary script strings via Compilable.compile() and execute() runs them via eval() with no ClassFilter, sandbox, or restricted ScriptContext. The bindings expose `_meta`, `args`, and `extParam`, but Nashorn/JS engines by default give scripts full access to Java reflection (e.g., Java.type('java.lang.Runtime').getRuntime().exec(...)). Comments in Operation.java explicitly warn 'JDK 8~13 可用自带 Nashorn 这个 js 引擎，注意配置 ClassFilter 防脚本注入攻击', but no ClassFilter is configured here. If script content is sourced from a database row, request payload, or any user-influenced channel (which the IF/CODE Operation suggests), this becomes RCE.
Affected files: JSR223ScriptExecutor.java
Signed-off-by: Nguyen Van Nam <nam.nv205106@gmail.com>
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Summary
Security: Unsandboxed JSR223 Script Execution Enables Arbitrary Code Execution
Problem
Severity:
Critical| File:APIJSONORM/src/main/java/apijson/orm/script/JSR223ScriptExecutor.java:L41JSR223ScriptExecutor.load() compiles arbitrary script strings via Compilable.compile() and execute() runs them via eval() with no ClassFilter, sandbox, or restricted ScriptContext. The bindings expose
_meta,args, andextParam, but Nashorn/JS engines by default give scripts full access to Java reflection (e.g., Java.type('java.lang.Runtime').getRuntime().exec(...)). Comments in Operation.java explicitly warn 'JDK 8~13 可用自带 Nashorn 这个 js 引擎，注意配置 ClassFilter 防脚本注入攻击', but no ClassFilter is configured here. If script content is sourced from a database row, request payload, or any user-influenced channel (which the IF/CODE Operation suggests), this becomes RCE.Solution
For Nashorn, instantiate via NashornScriptEngineFactory.getScriptEngine(ClassFilter) with a strict allowlist (deny java.lang.Runtime, ProcessBuilder, java.io., java.net., java.lang.reflect.*, java.lang.Class, etc.). For GraalJS, set polyglot.js.allowHostAccess=false, allowHostClassLookup=false, allowIO=false, allowCreateThread=false, and run with a resource-limited Context. Validate that scripts come only from trusted admin sources, and document this requirement prominently. Consider disabling script execution by default (AbstractFunctionParser.ENABLE_SCRIPT_FUNCTION = false).
Changes
APIJSONORM/src/main/java/apijson/orm/script/JSR223ScriptExecutor.java(modified)Testing
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